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Viewing cable 09BEIJING1176, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXDISCUSSES G-20, DPRK,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BEIJING1176.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09BEIJING1176	2009-04-30 13:07	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Embassy Beijing

Appears in these articles:
<http://www.spiegel.de>

VZCZCXRO3320
OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1176/01 1201307
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301307Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3773
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6920
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0575
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 001176

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2034
TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, PARM, PHUM, KUNR, CH, TW, KN, KS,
JA, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXDISCUSSES G-20, DPRK,
IRAN, AF/PAK, UNSC REFORM, TAIWAN, TIBET WITH CHARGE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

11. (C) Taiwan's participation as an observer at the upcoming May World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings demonstrated what could be achieved base
12. (S) Summary Continued: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX raised concerns over China's "core interests" of Tibet and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which he said cc
TAIWAN OBSERVERSHIP AT WHA

13. (C) The agreement allowing Taiwan to participate as an observer at the World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings in Geneva in May was "one step
IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL VISITS

14. (C) The Charge and XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of rec
15. (C) Although we recognize the importance of the proposed visit by Politburo Member and CCP Organization Department

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Head Li Yuanchao, it would be easier to arrange a successful visit if Li could postpone his travel to a less busy time, the Charge said. XXXXXXXX

16. (C) Reviewing the upcoming meetings between Presidents Obama and Hu this year, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX noted that, over the past 30 years, the U.S.-Ch
G-20: DATES AND TOPICS

17. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX stated that, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX he would ask to meet with NSC's Michael Froman in Washington and was considering requesting an
18. (C) In the first two G-20 Financial Summits, U.S. and Chinese positions had been close, closer even than the United States and Europe, XXXXX

19. (C) The first two G-20 summits, according to XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX had succeeded in boosting confidence and agreeing on measures to help internatice
A) Establish what stimulus and macroeconomic policy coordination the G-20 economies needed to implement to ensure economic recovery;
B) Strengthen the message against protectionism so that leaders did not "break their promises as soon as they returned home";
C) Set a clear timetable for IMF reform, establishing whether the New Arrangement to Borrow (NAB) decisions had any relation to future quota; a
D) Reforming the international monetary system, vis-a-vis the dollar and an alternative reserve currency such as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

110. (C) Expounding on this last topic, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX stated that a stable U.S. dollar was good for China, and Beijing had no interest in "dest
111. (U) Note: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX's comments on the Strategic and Economic Dialogue will be reported septel.

VFM HE'S WASHINGTON VISIT: DPRK, IRAN, AF/PAK

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112. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington, including North Korea, Iran and Afgh
113. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX also hoped to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue in Washington. Beijing appreciated the "bold steps" taken by Washington.

114. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX said he also hoped to discuss Afghanistan/Pakistan. The Charge stated that, even though XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX was unable to annou
TIBET AND TAIWAN AS "CORE INTERESTS"

115. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX raised concerns over China's "core interests" of Tibet and Taiwan, which he said could "derail" bilateral cooperation. Or
116. (C) The Charge expressed concern with China's defining Tibet as a "core issue" with the apparent expectation that others would "step back."

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¶17. (C) Another issue that could "derail" relations was arms sales to Taiwan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. China had long opposed U.S. arms sales to Tai HUMAN RIGHTS: LIU XIAOBO, GAO ZHISHENG

¶18. (C) The Charge raised two human rights cases, inquiring as to the status, location and treatment of dissident writer and Charter 08 signat NORTH KOREAN "GUESTS"

¶19. (S) The Charge emphasized the importance of expediting exit procedures from China for two North Koreans who had entered the Embassy compor U.S. JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN DPRK

¶20. (C) The Charge urged China to press the DPRK to release the two American journalists detained in North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that t UNSC REFORM

¶21. (C) China was concerned by "momentum" that was building on UN Security Council reform, which was "not good" for the P-5, XXXXXXXXXXXX sai COCA II: AVOIDING A "TRADE WAR"

¶22. (C) The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General BEIJING 00001176 005 OF 005

Beijing in an apparent attempt to gain leverage on office properties. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this situation sounded like a "trade war." The Charge PICCUTA